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Erisman: The Contested Will Case.

THE CONTESTED WILL CASE
FRED ERISMAN*
Few areas in the practice of law are as exacting, exciting and rewarding as the "Contested Will Case."
The adoption of the Texas Probate Code of 1955, plus numerous
appeals from the Probate Court to the District Court, thence to Courts
of Civil Appeals and the Supreme Court, have established approved
methods and judicial precedents by which the careful attorney for the
proponent or the contestant may now undertake representation of a
client with confidence.
Emphasis on the need and importance of a will has intrigued the
imagination of laymen in all economic circumstances and many
strange results have emerged.
Holographic wills, informally written on letter stationery, scraps of
paper, advertising material, or the back of an envelope, have been
probated and the apparent intentions of the testator achieved.
The cases arising from an application for letters testamentary "with
written will attached," will illustrate most of the technical, 'procedural
and evidentiary problems commonly encountered in all will contest
cases.
I.

TRIAL PROCEEDINGS IN THE COUNTY (PROBATE) COURT

Probate procedures being the creatures of Statute, the law itself
provides adequate guidance in the handling of the initial steps after
the death of the testator.
The statutory application for Letters Testamentary constitutes the
pleadings of the proponent of the will.' The Probate Code attempts
to simplify the pleadings of the proponent with this provision:
No defect of form or substance in any pleading in probate shall
be held by any court to invalidate such pleading, or any order
based upon such pleading, unless the defect has been timely objected to and called to the attention
of the court in which such
2
proceedings were or are pending.
In the absence of a contest in the county court, the proponent
usually offers the proof required by the Probate Code through the
testimony of the applicant, attesting witnesses or other available
* Attorney at Law, Longview, Texas; former Chairman, Judicial Section, State Bar of
Texas.
1 Tx. PRoD. CODE AN. § 81(a)(b)(c) (1956).
2 TFx. PROD. CODE ANN. § 9 (1956).

Published by Digital Commons at St. Mary's University, 2018

1

St. Mary's Law Journal, Vol. 1 [2018], No. 1, Art. 3

ST. MARY'S LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 1:37

sources. A self proving will is proved by the properly executed instrument itself.
A.

Self-Proving Wills

The Texas Probate Code provides for the execution of a will to be
made "self proved" by the affidavits of the testator and attesting witnesses made before an officer authorized to take acknowledgments to
deeds of conveyances and to administer oaths under the laws of this
state.
There is also the provision, "A self proved will may be admitted
to probate without the testimony of any subscribing witness, but
otherwise it shall be treated no differently than a will not self proved.
In particular and without limiting the generality of the foregoing, a
self proved will may be contested, or revoked or amended by a codicil
in exactly the same fashion as a will not self proved."
The affidavit and procedure to be followed are set forth in Section
59. Once this section has been properly complied with, Probate Code
Sections 84(a), 88(a)(b-3) permit the will to be admitted to probate
without further proof of its execution.
The "self proving" provisions are of much importance to the proponent in the presentation of a "self proved" will in a contest in the
probate court.
The burden of proof is always upon the proponent to show that the
will offered for probate has not been revoked. This applies to "self
proving" as well as all Texas wills. But when a properly executed
written will is produced which comes from the custody of those to
whom it had been delivered by the testator, or which is found among
the testator's papers in a place he usually kept his valuable papers,
and there is no suspicion cast upon the genuineness of the will, there
exists a presumption that the will has not been revoked. Under such
circumstances, a proponent has satisfied the statutory requirement to
prove no revocation.3
Hence, in the probate court, it is always advisable to present proof
both as to the custody of the "self proved" instrument, and that there
had been no revocation.
After this proof is presented, the burden shifts to the contestant,
even in the probate court, and testimony showing that the testator
was of sound mind at the time the will was executed is not required
8 Ashley v. Usher, 384 S.W.2d 696 (rex. Sup. 1964).
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of the proponent: "the contestant must prove testamentary inca4
pacity."
If the will is self proved as authorized by the Code, testimony
showing that the testator was of sound mind at the time the will
was executed is not required. See Sec. 88, Vernon's Ann. Probate
Code. The effect of this provision of the Code is to place the
burden of proof on this issue on the contestant. We think no further change in the prior law was intended by the provisions of
the Code authorizing self proving wills.5
The self proving provisions only have the effect of authorizing the
substitution of affidavits in lieu of testimony offered before the court.6
B.

Pleadings

We are concerned with "Contested Wills." We shall assume that
upon the filing of the application for letters testamentary and the
issuance of citation, the contestants make their appearance in court
before the county judge and the contest is "on."
Pleadings of the contestant are not statutory as is the application of
the proponent.
Since the issues in controversy may not be enlarged upon appeal to
the District Court,7 the careful counsel for the contestant will inject
every possible contention to invalidate the instrument or the proceedings. Usually these pleadings include allegations as to: (1) Testator's lack of testamentary capacity, or unsoundness of mind; (2) Undue
influence in execution of the testamentary instrument; (3) Insane
delusions of the testator concerning a beneficiary; (4) Forgery of the
instrument either as to the maker or witnesses; (5) Failure to execute
the purported will in accordance with statutory requirements; and (6)
Any combination of the foregoing, with anything in addition that a
resentful relative, interested person or resourceful counsel can formulate.
After the filing of the contestant's pleadings, the proponent should
be ever alert to level exceptions at this "first speech to the jury."
Failure to do so gives the contestant a clear field in which he may succeed in strewing seeds before the court-and more especially the jury
4 Lee v. Lee, 413 S.W.2d 931 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1967, rev. other grounds
424 S.W.2d 609).
6 Brewer v. Foreman, 362 S.W.2d 350 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston 1962, no writ).
6 In re Price's Estate, 375 S.W.2d 900 (Tex. Sup. 1964).
7 Holliday v. Smith, 422 S.W.2d 791 (Tex. Civ. App.--Corpus Christi 1967, writ ref'd
nx.e.); Gray v. Bird, 380 S.W.2d 908 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1964, writ ref'd n.r.e.);
Roberts v. Bush, 352 S.W.2d 337 (rex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1962, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
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-that will grow into a fertile harvest that he would never have been
able to germinate with proper proof or evidence from the proponent.
The usual exceptions: (1) Conclusions of the pleader; (2) Inflammatory and prejudicial; (3) Evidentiary; (4) Argumentative; and (5)
Violation of Article 3715 (Dead Man's Statute) will often strike from
the pleadings the objectionable pyrotechnics without depriving the
contestant of his basic issue upon which the contest is based.
Most important to the defending proponent, the exception method
requires the contestant to be more specific in his proof of the basic
contentions: (1) Lack of testamentary capacity, or unsoundness of
mind, are so elusive in their nature that the exceptions will not
usually result in more detailed pleadings, but will strike prejudicial
argument; (2) Undue influence is more specific. The proponent is
entitled to know who exercised such influence, where, when and how;
(3) Insane delusions are likewise capable of being made certain.
What was the delusion? How did it manifest itself in the Will?; (4)
Where was a forgery committed in the instrument, in content or in
signature?; and (5) Specifically wherein did the execution of the instrument-or the qualifications of the attesting witnesses-fall short
of the statute?
Without such exceptions the contestant is not limited to time,
place nor character of proof that may be offered. Even though the
exceptions may result in the contestant pleading evidence, the "forewarning" is usually worth the risk.
By supplemental pleadings, and without disturbing the basic application for letters testamentary, the diligent proponent will file a
full denial of each and every allegation in the contest, and may plead
(so far as contestant's exceptions to such answer will permit) the proponent's contentions, explanations and answers as to why the deceased
preferred the proponent over the contestant. "So long as the pleadings do not amount to a device by which information is brought
before the jury which they could not have by way of testimony admissible upon the trial they are proper."8
C.

Failure To Offer Contesting Proof

Since jury trials are not available for probate matters in the county
court,9 there is a tendency for the contestant to offer as little proof as
possible in the county court proceedings. There is an element of
S Trouppy v. De Bus, 311 S.W.2d 431 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1958, writ ref'd
n.r.e.).
1)
TEX. PROB. CODE. ANN. § 21 (1956),
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danger at this point because the failure of the contestant to offer at
least a scintilla of proof on each contention is sometimes considered
an "abandonment" or "waiver" of such contention, and may not be
available on the trial in the District Court. 10
A problem of "Burden of Proof" results from failure to contest at
the time the will is first offered for probate in the county court.
The rule is well settled that in a proceeding to set aside the probate
of a will that has been admitted to probate, the burden of proof is
upon the party who brings the contest."
When the instrument is a self proving will, the burden is on the
12
contestant from the inception.
In the probate court the burden is upon the proponent to meet the
statutory requirements before the will may be admitted for probate.
In a recent case, even though counsel for the parties agreed that it
would not be necessary for contestants to offer evidence in support of
their contest in the county court and that such action would in no way
prejudice the rights of the contestants to their appeal, a motion for
summary judgment by the proponents of the will was sustained, and
13
the appeal dismissed.
To be binding upon the trial court, agreements made between opposing counsel must be preserved and evidenced in conformity with
Tex. R. Civ. P. 11.
Failure or refusal to tender evidence in support of an action to set
aside the county court order admitting a will to probate, constitutes
4
an abandonment of the will contest suit as a matter of law.'
The contestant should make certain that there is some evidence in
the probate proceedings to support every serious contention in the
jury trial in the District Court.
D. Appeals (and Review) in the District Court
Once a judgment has been rendered in the county court, it is imperative that the losing party promptly perfect an appeal to the District Court, or bear severe consequences.
10 Thompson v. Kirkland, 422 S.W.2d 258 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana 1967, no
writ).
11 TEx. PROB. CODE ANN. § 93 (1956); Boyd v. Frost Nat. Bank, 145 Tex. 206, 196
S.W.2d 497 (1946).
12 Lee v. Lee, 424 S.W.2d 609 (Tex. Sup. 1968) (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1967, 413
S.W.2d 931).
'3 Thompson v. Kirkland, 422 S.W.2d 258 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana 1967, no
writ).
14Cullinan v. Cullinan, 154 Tex. 247, 275 S.W.2d 472 (1955); Crane v. Pierce, 257
S.W.2d 510 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1953, writ ref'd nx.e.); Bell v. Bell, 248 S.W.2d
978 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1952, writ ref'd n.r.e).
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Ordinary Appeal

The District Court has appellate jurisdiction over the county court
in all probate matters. 15 The parties are entitled to a trial by jury as
in other civil actions in the District Court. 16 Any person who may consider himself aggrieved by any decision, order, decree, or judgment
of the probate court shall have the right to appeal therefrom to the
District Court of the county,' 7 in which the probate proceedings were
had.
Texas Rules of Civil Procedure" prescribe the details incident to
such appeal, with specific emphasis upon notice,19 bond,20 appeal on
affidavit,21 suspension of judgment,22 transcript on appeal,23 docketing
of cause by the district clerk,24 and proceeding in the District Court.
The trial of such probate matters in the District Court is de novo
and is governed by the same rules and procedures as other civil cases
in that court. 25
These rules have been strictly enforced. Failure to file the required
bond with the county clerk within fifteen days from the date of rendition of the judgment will result in a dismissal of the appeal. 2
It is the appealing party's duty to be sure that the transcript is not
only properly prepared, but promptly filed with the clerk of the District Court within thirty days from the date of the rendition of the
judgment so appealed from. (Subject to the right of extension as
provided by Rule 336 upon a showing of good cause timely made.) 27

Failure to timely comply with Rule 336 will deprive the District
Court of jurisdiction, and the trial judge will have no alternative
28
other than to dismiss the appeal.

Where timely appeal has not been taken, the appealing party
may within two years after rendition of the county court judgment
15 TEX.
16 TEX.
17 TEX.
18 TEx.
19 TEX.

PitOB. CODE. ANN.

§

5 (1956).

PROB. CODE. ANN. § 21(1956).

PROB. CODE. ANN. § 28 (1956).
R. Civ. P. 332-339.
R. Civ. P. 332.
20 TEX. R. Cirv. P. 333.
21 TEX. R. Civ. P. 334.
22 TEx. R. Civ. P. 335.
23 Tax. R. CIv. P. 336.
24 TEX. R. Civ. P. 337.
25 TEX. R. Civ. P. 337.
26Roberts v. Roberts, 405 S.W.2d 211 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1966, writ ref'd n.r.e.);
Brooks v. Hext, 392 S.W.2d 500 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont 1965, no writ).
27 Hamilton v. McAmis, 401 S.W.2d 314 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1966, no writ).
28Young v. Young, 429 S.W.2d 527 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1968, writ ref'd);
Hamilton v. McAmis, 401 S.W.2d 314 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1966, no writ).
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resort to certiorarior bill of review, but he must assume the burden
of proof, and, without additional proceedings, his appeal does not
stay the judgment of the probate court.
(2.)

Certiorari

Any person interested in proceeding in probate may have the proceedings of the county court therein revised and corrected at any time
29
within two years after such proceedings were had by certiorari.
This is also a de novo procedure in the District Court, and is a
restatement of Revised Civil Statute 932, which existed prior to the
adoption of the Probate Code. The remedy of certiorari is distinctly
statutory, and is not made dependent upon showing why an appeal
was not pursued.3 0
Texas Rules of Civil Procedure 344 through 351 are concerned with
"Certiorari to County Court" and these provisions and rules must be
31
complied with.
On appeal by certiorari, the District Court may consider alleged
32
errors of fact as well as alleged errors of law.
(3.)

Bill of Review

Any person interested may, by a bill of review filed in the court in
which the proceedings were had, have any decision, order or judgment rendered by the court, or by the judge thereof, revised and corrected on showing error therein; no bill of review shall be filed after
two years have elapsed from the date of such decision, order or judgment. 33
This is a statutory proceeding and is not subject to the limitations
or requirements of an equitable review. It is a direct attack on the
judgment of the county court, and all persons who might be in any
way affected by its result must be before the court. The jurisdiction
of the District Court being appellate in nature, the issues are limited
34
to those properly raised in the county court.
29 TEx. PROB. CODE ANN. § 30 (1956).

30 Shirey v. Harris, 288 S.W.2d 315 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1956, no writ).
31 Moore v. McInnis, 295 S.W.2d 707 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland 1956, writ ref'd
n.r.e.).
32 Clayton v. Clayton, 308 S.W.2d 557 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana 1957, no writ).
33 TEx. PROB. CODE ANN. § 31 (1956).
84 Schoenhals v. Schoenhals, 366 S.W.2d 594 (Tex. Civ. App.--Amarillo 1963, writ ref'd
n.r.e.).
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TRIAL IN THE DISTRICT COURT

With the completion of the necessary preliminaries to reach the
District Court, the contested will case takes on the character of an
ordinary civil case.
A.

Pleadings

The pleadings have been cast in the probate court, but amendments
to the pleadings may be made, exceptions urged, and repleadings had,
limited only by the appellate jurisdiction of the District Court: (a) to
revise, declare void or set aside orders and decrees of the county court
sitting in probate, and (b) no enlargement of the issues tried in the
county court will be permitted on appeal.3 5 The trial must be conducted as if the suit had been originally brought in the District
Court.

36

When appeal to the District Court is perfected, a trial de novo is
required in that court. The parties occupy the same positions they
occupied in the probate court. Subject to the right of allowable
amendment, the cause stands for trial on the pleadings in the tran37
script sent up from the probate court.
B.

Jury
If trial by jury is desired, application and deposit of the necessary
jury fee should be made in accordance with TEX. R. CIv. P. 216.
C.

Discovery

Discovery proceedings are available, and oral and written interrogatories may be propounded as in all other civil cases. If depositions
were properly taken in the probate court they may be offered in evidence in the District Court.38 Appeal to the District Court is not a

new suit. It is a continuation of the original contest commenced in
county court and depositions may be read in evidence upon the trial
in any suit in which they were taken. 39
35 Holliday v. Smith, 422 S.W.2d 791 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi 1967, writ ref'd
n.r.e.); In the Matter of the Estate of Robert A. Martin, Deceased, 284 S.W.2d 279 (Tex.
Civ. App.-E1 Paso 1955, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
36Bunting v. Chess, 416 S.W.2d 492 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland 1967, writ dism'd);
A.&M. College of Texas v. Guinn, 280 S.W.2d 373 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1955, writ ref'd
n.r.e.).
37 Freeman v. Freeman, 160 Tex. 148, 327 S.W.2d 428 (1959).
38 Gray v. Bird, 380 S.W.2d 908 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1964, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
39 Carpenter v. Tinney, 420 S.W.2d 241 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1967, no writ).
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Texas Revised Civil Statutes Ann. Article 3716 ("Dead Man's
Statute")

Much thought should be given before, an effort is made to request
admissions, propound interrogatories, or take the deposition of an
adverse party whose lips might be otherwise sealed by the application
40
of the Dead Man's Statute.
The cases are legion where parties have abandoned and waived the
protection of this statute, and invited damaging testimony from an
otherwise disqualified witness by taking the deposition of such party,
41
requesting admissions, or propounding interrogatories to such party.
E.

"Open and Close"

It is not unusual for a contestant to a will admitted to probate in
the county court to attempt to obtain the right to "open and close"
the trial in the District Court by filing the admission permitted by
Rule 266 TEx. R. Civ. P.
The Supreme Court of Texas in a per curiam opinion concerning
"testamentary capacity of the testator '' 42 seems to declare the rule to
be that "the contestants could not properly secure the right to open
and close the argument under Rules 266 and 269, Texas Rules of
Civil Procedure, by voluntarily assuming the burden of proof on that
issue. In order to gain such a right, it would be necessary that testamentary capacity be unequivocally admitted or established as a matter
of law and the issue thus removed from the case."
In a case involving a self proving will, 48 approval was given to the
trial court's refusal to permit the contestant to open and close the
arguments as being harmless error, even though the contestant had
the actual burden of proof on the issue of soundness of mind of the
testatrix.
40 Tax. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art.

3716:

In actions by or against executors, administrators, or guardians, in which judgment
may be rendered for or against them as such, neither party shall be allowed to
testify against the others as to any transaction with, or statement by, the testator,
intestate or ward, unless called to testify thereto by the opposite party; and the
provisions of this article shall extend to and include all actions by or against the
heirs or legal representatives of a decedent arising out of any transaction with
such decedent.
41 Walker, The Dead Man's Statute, 27 Tex. B. J. 315 (1964); Garcia v. Barrera, 385
S.W.2d 606 (Tex. Civ. App-Eastland 1964, writ ref'd nx.e.); Burris v. Levy, 302
S.W.2d 171 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1957, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
42 Seigler v. Seigler, 391 S.W.2d 403 (Tex. Sup. 1965).
48 In re Estate of Price, 401 S.W.2d 98 (rex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1966, writ ref'd
nx.e.).
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Burden of Proof

If the contest originated in the probate court, and the will was not
self proving, the burden of proof both in the probate court and the
District Court is upon the proponent to establish the validity of the
will.44
Any suit to annul the probate of a will already probated places the
burden upon the contestants to establish the incapacity of a testator
45
by a preponderance of the evidence.
Where the will in controversy is a self proving will, in order to
overcome the effect of a certificate of acknowledgment, the burden of
proof is upon the contestant, and the proponent is not required to
prove that the testator was of sound mind at the time the will was
executed.4 It would seem, however, that the proponent should always
assume the burden, and offer proof, that the will had not been re47
voked.
G.

Jury Selection

Courts have judicially noted: "It is the common idea that every
child has the right to some of the property of the parents upon their
decease, and the mere fact alone that a child is disinherited often
exerts a potent influence over the minds of the average jury. But that
48
is not the law of this State."
Counsel for the proponent may find it advantageous in his preliminary statements to the panel and examination of prospective
jurors: (1) To advise the panel that "this is a case in which the deceased (naming and identifying with proponents) died on
leaving a will in which my clients were the principal beneficiaries."
(Naming, introducing and identifying each and the relationship with
the deceased); (2) To make a very casual mention of the identity of
the contestant and his or her relationship with the deceased, and the
allegations upon which the contest is based; (3) To ask the prospective
jurors to indicate by a show of hands which ones have at that very
time a written will disposing of their property in the event of death.
(A prospective juror with an executed will may reasonably be expected to want to enforce the terms of the written will of another);
44 TEX. PROD. CODE ANN. § 88 (1956); Watson v. Watson, 340 S.W.2d 344 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Fort Worth 1960, writ dism'd).
45 Lee v. Lee, 424 S.W.2d 609 (Tex. Sup. 1968); Chambers v. Winn, 137 Tex. 444, 154
S.W.2d 454 (1941).
46 Brewer v. Foreman, 362 S.W.2d 350 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston 1962, no writ).
47 TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 88(b) 1, 2, 3 (1956).
48 Stolle v. Kanetzky, 220 S.W. 557 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1920, no writ).
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(4) To elicit from each prospective juror a specific statement that
such juror has no prejudice, or preconceived bias against the propositions: That wills represent a most solemn and personal undertaking
of the testator-That wills are made to be respected-That wills are
not made to be broken-That wills may be set aside only for legal
causes-That a will may not be set aside merely because it is not the
will that some interested person or jury might think the testator
should have made; 49 and (5) To commit each prospective juror (so
far as the trial judge will permit) to the proposition that "until it
has been established by a preponderance of the evidence that the right
of the deceased to make a disposition of his or her property by will,
had been forfeited, or imposed upon, that such juror would uphold
the hand of the deceased in so disposing of his or her property."
The counsel for contestant will often place great emphasis upon
what he expects to show as to: age, physical and mental condition of
the testator; unnaturalness of the will; opportunity afforded alleged
wrongdoer to control decedent's actions; facts attending preparation
and execution of the instrument; and the actual fraud that was perpetrated upon the testator.5 0
Counsel either for the proponent or contestant could well set the
tempo of the trial by reading the comments of Justice Fly in Salinas v.
Garcia, 135 S.W. 588 (Tex. Civ. App. 1911, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
When there are multiple parties as proponents (usually sisters and
brothers) and the contestant charges undue influence or improper conduct on the part of one or more of such proponents, Texas Rule of
Civil Procedure 233 should be resorted to and individual peremptory
challenges sought for each of such parties.
H.

Evidence
After selection of the jury, presentation of pleadings, and swearing
of the witnesses, the proponent should exercise great care to comply
with the mandatory provisions of Section 88 of the Probate Code.
Even if the instrument is denominated a "Self Proving Will," 5 1 the

impact on the jury of the first impression will be lost if the proponent
is satisfied to simply make a "prima facie case."
The number of witnesses that may be used will depend entirely
upon the circumstances of the particular case. Once the statutory
49 Mason v. Mason, 369 S.W.2d 829 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1963, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
50 Gunlock v. Greenwade, 280 S.W.2d 610 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1955, writ ref'd
n.r.e.).
51 TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 59 (1956).
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requirements have been met, then the contestant must take the "laboring oar," not only to destroy the will itself, but to discredit, contradict and overcome the testimony that has been offered at the outset
52
of the trial.
1.

Statutory Requirements That May Be Proved by Documentary
Evidence
(1.) Citation and Return Thereon

Section 128 of the Probate Code provides for the issuance of a
citation to all parties interested in an estate for which there has
been an application to probate a will. Citation is served by the Sheriff
or Constable posting it at the door of the Courthouse of the County
in which the proceedings are pending, for not less than ten (10) days
before the return day thereof.5 3
No application for the probate of a will, or the issuance of letters
testamentary shall be acted upon until service of citation has been
made the manner therein provided. It is, therefore, necessary that
properserving of citation be called to the attention of the Judge and
introduced into evidence as part of the record of the case.
(2.) Certified Copy of Death Certificate of the Testator
Frequently the offer of a properly certified copy of the death certificate of the deceased will make a prima facie showing that the person
therein named is dead, and that four years have not elapsed since his
decease and prior to the application; jurisdictional and venue requirements are assisted by recitations in the certificate showing place of
death, length of residence at the place of death, and in the State; and
that the person named in the death certificate was at least 19 years
of age, or was lawfully married.
Death certificates complying fully with the provisions of Vernon's
Ann. Civ. St. Article 4477, Rule 54a, and properly certified by the
State Registrar are not only admissible in evidence, but are prima
facie evidence of the facts therein stated. 54 However, similar certifi52 Bryant v. Hamlin, 373 S.W.2d 837 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1963, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
53 TEx. PROB. CODE ANN. § 33 (1957).

54 Reserve Life Ins. Co. v. Shacklett's Estate, 412 S.W.2d 920 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler
1967, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Estate of McKinney v. Hair, 434 S.W.2d 217 (Tex. Civ. App.Waco 1968, no writ). The correct address for the State Registrar is: TEXAS STATE
DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH, State Bureau of Vital Statistics, 410 East 5th Street, Austin,
Texas 78701.
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cates by local registrars, Justices of the Peace, and like officers, may be
properly excluded. 55
J. Statutory Requirements Usually Proved by the Applicant
Were it not for the operation of the Texas Dead Man's Statute,
restricting testimony of certain parties as to transactions with, or statements by, the testator, many of the remaining elements necessary to
probate could be established in most cases by the testimony of the
applicant alone.
It is usually advantageous to introduce the applicant in court so the
court and jury may have an opportunity to observe him, or her, and
to show that he or she is not disqualified by law to receive letters testamentary or of administration.
The Probate Code clearly enumerates those disqualified: 56 a minor;
an incompetent; a convicted felon under the laws either of the United
States or of any Territory of the United States, or the District of Columbia, unless fully pardoned or civil rights restored in accordance
with law; a non-resident of this State who has not appointed a resident
agent to accept service of process, etc.; a corporation not authorized to
act as a fiduciary in Texas; an alien disqualified by law; or a person
whom the court finds unsuitable.
A few simple questions directed to each applicable item are sufficient.
Another requirement is met by asking the applicant "Are you one
and the same person as blank, named as executor in this instrument?"
K.

Statutory Requirements Usually Proved by the Attesting or Other
Witnesses
(1.) , Venue
The Probate Code 57 provides that "The county court shall have the

general jurisdiction of a probate court. It shall probate wills ...

grant

letters testamentary . . transact all business appertaining to estates,
and distribution of such estates."
But Section 6 of the Probate Code controls venue. The particular
county court in which the will shall be admitted to probate and letters
55 Hedtke v. Transport Ins. Co., 383 S.W.2d 474 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1964,
writ ref'd n.r.e.); Midwestern Ins. Co. v. Wagner, 370 S.W.2d 779 (Tex. Civ. App.Eastland 1963, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Texas Reserve Life Ins. Co. v. Dees, 368 S.W.2d 886
(Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1963, writ re'd n.r.e.).
56 TEx. PROB. CODE ANN. § 78 (1956).
57 TEx. PROB. CODE ANN. § 4 (1956).
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testamentary shall be granted may be in the county where the deceased
resided, if he had a domicile or fixed place of residence in this State.
If the deceased had no domicile or fixed place of residence in this
State but died in this State, then the court in the county where his
principalproperty was at the time of his death, or in the county where
he died has jurisdiction. If he had no domicile or fixed place of residence in this State and died outside the limits of this State, then the
court in the county of this State where his nearest of kin reside has
jurisdiction. But if he had no kindred in this State, then the court in
the county where his principal estate was situated at the time of his
death has jurisdiction.
Section 8 of the Probate Code anticipates multiple filings of applications to probate, and attempts to settle this problem by providing:
When two or more courts have concurrent venue of an estate, the
court in which the application for Probate Proceedings thereon is
first filed, shall have, and retain jurisdiction of the estate to the
exclusion of the other court or courts.
A much publicized case 58 arose from the death of a Texas testator in Cherokee County, who was born in Rusk County, and who had
substantial property in Johnson County. An early filing of the purported will in Johnson County gave that Probate Court jurisdiction
and controlled the subsequent appeals thereon.
It is now established law in Texas that the court in which the application is first filed, has authority to "decide the truth of the averments as to the decedent's residence, and its decision thereon is conclusive and not subject to collateral attack."5 9
Part of the proponent's proof must comply with these sections. In
most cases the place of death of the deceased is the arena for the litigation. Tax records, neighbors, voting records, poll tax receipts, automobile registrations, and bank deposits all assist in establishing venue.
(2.) Sound Mind-Testamentary Capacity-Insane Delusion
a. Sound Mind. The burden is upon the proponent to make a
prima facie case that when the testator signed the will, and when it
was witnessed as required by law, he was of sound mind.60
This simply means that at both such times, the testator must have
58 Kirk v. Beard, 162 Tex. 144, 345 S.W.2d 267 (1961).
59 White v. Baker, 118 S.W.2d 319 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont 1938, no writ).
60Agricultural and Mechanical College v. Guinn, 326 S.W.2d 609 (Tex. Civ. App.Austin 1959, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
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had sufficient ability to understand: the business upon which he was
engaged; the effect of the act of making a will; capacity to know the
objects of his bounty and their claims upon him; and the general nature and extent of his property.
There has been much confusion in connection with the offering of
proof upon this important part of a will contest case. Proponent and
contestant alike have had their case reversed because they improperly
offered proof over timely objection. Examples of mistakes made in this
area are: (1) Not showing the witness was qualified; (2) Offering proof
that invaded the province of the jury; (3) Offering proof that presented a mixed question of law and fact as to legal capacity; (4) Permitting application of a standard of testamentary capacity which did
not comply with Texas law; and (5) Presenting a legal conclusion and
similar objections.
The problems have arisen because certain of the questions have
asked whether the testator possessed the degree of intelligence to do
what he did, as distinguished from an opinion as to whether he was
mentally capable of knowing or understanding the nature and effect
of his acts.6'
McCormick and Ray "Texas Law of Evidence," Volume 2, Sec.
1421, page 254, 256 states the rule:
No witness, whether expert or non-expert, will be permitted to
express an opinion on the legal capacity of a person to perform
the act in question, such as the making of a will . . . because the

existence of testamentary capacity involves the application of a
legal definition to the factual data of mental condition, and the
opinion leaves uncertainty whether the witness is applying his
own or the law's standard of required capacity.
Hypothetical questions, when properly predicated, are admissible.
Likewise, opinions may be obtained from friends, neighbors, and associates, as well as doctors and experts.
It is within the discretion of the trial judge to receive such testimony once the witness has shown opportunity for observation of the
habits, conduct, expressions, peculiarities, disposition, temper or character of the testator; and that his testimony is based upon his own

62
knowledge or observation.

The writer tries to bring to court witnesses known to members of
the jury to be responsible and reputable persons and who knew the
61 40 A.L.R.2d 91 § 40.
62 Chambers v. Winn, 137 Tex. 444, 154 S.W.2d 454 (1941).
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testator in his ordinary activities of life, work, church, family and every day life.
After accounting for their association with the testator and opportunity to be around him prior to, at the time of, and subsequent to the
making of the will in controversy, we are satisfied with questions such
as:13 "Mr. Witness, based upon the things you have testified about, and
your observations of the testator, and your acquaintance and observations and knowledge of his habits and his nature, do you have an opinion as to whether he was of sound or unsound mind on the - day of
•(The date of the will)?"
After an affirmative answer, we then ask: "What is that opinion?" and
the witness usually forcibly replies: "He was of sound mind."
The Beaumont Court of Civil Appeals, in writing on two cases,
seems to have resolved the questions that may be asked a doctor.6 4 Its

holdings are:
A doctor can go further in giving his opinion regarding the mental capacity of the testator than could a layman witness.
On another trial, the physician (who treated the testator professionally during his lifetime, and otherwise showed himself acquainted with him) should be permitted to give his opinion of the
testator's ability to understand: the business in which he was engaged; the effect of his act in making the will; the nature and extent of his property; his next of kin and the natural objects of his
bounty and their claims upon him; to have memory sufficient to
collect in his mind the elements of his business in which he was
engaged; to hold them long enough to perceive at least their obvious relation to each other; and to be able to form a reasonable
judgment as to them. 65
b. Testamentary Capacity. Testamentary capacity and sound mind
mean the same thing. 66
In a fairly recent case, Chief Justice Massey of the Fort Worth Court
of Civil Appeals reiterates the long established rule in Texas: 67
When the term "sound mind" is used in connection with the
right and power to make and execute wills in Texas its meaning
Hubbell v. Donaldson, 243 S.W.2d 867 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland 1951, no writ).
64Wilkinson v. Wilkinson, 322 S.W.2d 662 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont 1959, writ
dism'd); Welch v. Shoubrouek, 260 S.W.2d 84 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont 1953, no writ).
65 Peareson v. McNabb, 190 S.W.2d 402 (Tex. Civ. App.-Galveston 1945, writ dism'd
W.O.m.).
66 Garcia v. Galindo, 189 S.W.2d 12 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1945, writ ref'd
W.O.m.).
67 Anderson v. Clingingsmith, 369 S.W.2d 634 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1963,
writ ref'd n.r.e.).
63
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is synonymous with a testator's testamentary capacity, invariably
dependent upon the showing as to whether such person understood and appreciated the consequences of executing the propounded script (citing many cases).
Here a jury finding "He was of sound mind," was approved with the
suggestion that a "yes" or "no" answer would have been preferable.
In this case the burden of proof was on the proponent of the will.
He was obliged by the court's charge to submit and obtain a favorable
finding on the issue of whether testator had "testamentary capacity" or
was of "sound mind." This he did.
The definition of "Testamentary Capacity" found in Lindley v.
Lindley68 is substantially the same definition as used in defining
"Sound Mind."
You are further instructed that to make a valid will, the person
making the will must have testamentary capacity at the time of
the execution of the will. By the term "testamentary capacity" as
used in this charge, is meant that the person at the time of the execution of the will has sufficient mental ability to understand the
business in which she is engaged, and the effect of her act in making the will, and the general nature and extent of her property.
She must also be able to know her next of kin and the natural
objects of her bounty and their claims upon her. She must have
memory sufficient to collect in her mind the elements of the business to be transacted and to hold them long enough to perceive,
at least their obvious relation to each other, and to be able to
form a reasonable judgment as to them.
Courts and juries can go no further than to determine whether the
testator's mental capacity measures up to the standard set by the law.
Though a testator may be aged, infirm and sick, he has the right to
dispose of his property in any manner that he may desire if his mental
ability meets the law's tests. It is not for courts, juries, relatives, or
friends to say how property should be passed by will, or to rewrite a
will for a testator because they do not believe he made a wise or fair
distribution of his property. 69
c. Insane Delusions. Insane delusions are not by themselves grounds
of attack against the probating of a will, except as they show a want of
testamentary capacity. The real defense is want of testamentary capacity, whether such want of capacity is produced by ordinary and
68 384 S.W.2d 676 (Tex. Sup. 1964).
69 Nowlin v. Trottman, 348 S.W.2d 169 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1961, writ ref'd
n.r.e.),
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complete insanity, or by temporary aberrations or insane delusions.
The real vice, from a judicial standpoint-which in either case vitiates
the instrument-is want of capacity.70
The courts of Texas have defined "insane delusion" as "the belief
of a state of supposed facts that do not exist, and which no rational
7
person would believe." '
A person who is entirely capable of attending to his business affairs may nevertheless have his mind so warped and deranged by some
false and unfounded belief that he is incapable of formulating a rational plan of testamentary disposition. Examples of such false beliefs
are cases where the "testator believed, in spite of the fact that all the
evidence was to the contrary, that his son had been to the planet Mars
and had conspired against the United States and should therefore be
disinherited; or that his wife was plotting to kill him; or that his
daughter had murdered his father; or that he was hated by his brothers
and sisters who were bent on persecuting him."
When the testator's false belief amounts, in law, to an insane delusion and the terms of his will are influenced thereby, testamentary capacity is lacking even though he might know the nature and extent of
his property, the effect of his will, and the natural objects of his
72
bounty, and be able to handle complicated business matters.
the absence of insane
The proponent has the burden of establishing
73
issue.
an
is
delusion
a
such
where
delusion,
It is well settled that an insane delusion in regard to one who would
be a natural object of the testator's bounty will destroy the will on the
74
ground of mental incapacity.
To justify the setting aside of a will on the ground that the testator
was possessed of an insane delusion, it must be shown that the will was
the product, or offspring, of delusion or at least that it was influenced
75
by the delusion.
When the proponent proves that the testator was a person of sound
mind, he meets the burden placed upon him, since insane delusions
are generally considered in connection with testamentary capacity.
70 Rodgers v. Fleming, 3 S.W.2d 77 (Tex. Comm'n App. 1928, holding approved).

71 Knight v. Edwards, 153 Tex. 170, 264 S.W.2d 692 (1954).
72 Lindley v. Lindley, 384 S.W.2d 676 (Tex. Sup. 1964).
73 Gulf Oil Corporation v. Walker, 288 S.W.2d 173 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont
no writ); Lanham v. Lanham, 146 S.W. 635 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana 1912, no
74 Stone v. Grainger, 66 S.W.2d 484 (Tex. Civ. App.--Galveston 1933, no writ);
gers v. Fleming, 3 S.W.2d 77 (Tex. Comm'n App. 1928, holding approved).
75 In re Lockhart's Estate, 258 S.W.2d 877 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1953)
Knight v. Edwards, 153 Tex. 170, 264 S.W.2d 692 (1954).
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Using abundant caution with a properly competent witness, further
proof may be offered by asking the witness: "Did you ever hear the testator make any statement to the effect ...

(here setting forth the delu-

sion that is alleged to have influenced the will)?"
If there is any evidence of probative value that, with the inferences
that may reasonably be drawn therefrom, will support a finding that
the testator was laboring under such a delusion which affected the
terms of the will, an additional instruction on insane delusion is re76
quired.
Under such circumstances, the contestant should consider a special
requested issue to the effect:
Do you find from a preponderance of the evidence that at the
time of the execution of the instrument before you (exhibit No.
(testator) was not influenced by an insane
delusion, if any, as that term is here defined?
An "insane delusion" as that term is used in this issue means the
belief of a state of supposed facts which no rational person would
believe and which influenced the person executing such will to
dispose of her property in a way which she would not have disposed of it, but for the insane delusion, if any.
Answer: "She was not so influenced"; or
"She was so influenced."
Answer:
(3.)

Execution of Instrument

In order to become a "will" (except where otherwise provided by
law), every such instrument must be: (1) In writing; (2) Signed by the
testator in person-or by another person for him by his directionand in his presence; and (3) Attested by two or more credible witnesses
above the age of 14 years, who shall subscribe their names thereto in
their own handwriting in the presence of the testator. 77
Since we have limited our discussion to such an instrument, we will
expect it to contain the usual attestation clause as follows: "The above
and foregoing will of blank was here now published, signed and executed by the said blank as his last will and testament, and we at his
request, and in his presence, and in the presence of each other, subscribed our names thereto as witnesses." (Stayton Form Book, Section
4460).
76 Lindley v. Lindley, 384 S.W.2d 676 (Tex. Sup. 1964).
77 TEx. POB. CODE ANN. § 59 (1956).
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The witnessing of the will and attestation thereto is essential for the
non-holographic will to be admitted to probate. The recitations in the
attestation clause suffice as proof (even when a witness cannot remember attesting the will), 7 and raise a presumption of the due execution
of the willy 9

Let us assume one or more of the attesting witnesses is available.
Such witness (either in person or by deposition) will be sworn and
will detail the circumstances under which the will was signed by the
testator, when, where, and such other pertinent information as he may
recall. Counsel must be careful to show that the age of such witness
was above fourteen (14) years, that the testator was then over nineteen
(19) years of age, lawfully married, or a member of the armed forces,
etc., and that the witnesses signed their names as such in the presence
of the testator.
In the absence of a direct attack, it is unnecessary to offer direct
testimony that the witnesses to the will were credible; a credible witness attesting a will means one competent under the law to testify to
the execution of a will. 80

If an attack has been made upon the witnesses in the contest, then
there is the additional burden of showing such witness to be credible.
A "credible witness" means a competent witness. It means one who is
able to tell about the attestation.8 ' "A witness who receives no pecuni82
ary benefits under its terms" is credible, if otherwise competent.
Attestation of a will is the act of witnessing the performance of the
statutory requirements for a valid execution, and the witnesses signing
their names to the instrument in the presence of the testator. 83 It is
not required in this State that the witnesses sign the instrument in the
presence of each other.84 Generally it is not essential to the validity of
a will that it should be read over to the witnesses thereto, nor that
85
they should know its contents.
There have been circumstances where the witnesses were dead, had
78Reese v. Franzheim, 381 S.W.2d 329 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston 1964, writ ref'd
n.r.e.); Wilson v. Paulus, 15 S.W.2d 571 (Tex. Comm'n App. 1929, holding approved).
79 Seydler v. Baumgarten, 294 S.W.2d 467 (Tex. Civ. App.-Galveston 1956, writ ref'd

n.r.e.).

Ford v. Ross, 150 S.W.2d 144 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1941, no writ).
Krahl v. Lehmann, 277 S.W.2d 792 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1955), 155 Tex.
270, 285 S.W.2d 179 (1955).
82 Scandurro v. Beto, 234 S.W.2d 695 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1950, no writ).
83 Gainer v. Johnson, 211 S.W.2d 789 (Tex. Civ. App.-Galveston 1948, no writ).
84 Gainer v. Johnson, 211 S.W.2d 789 (Tex. Civ. App.-Galveston 1948, no writ).
85Davis v. Davis, 45 S.W.2d 240 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont 1931, no writ).
80
81
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moved away, or "forgotten" witnessing the purported will. Probate
Code, Section 84 (sub-section 3) anticipates these circumstances:
Attested written will ...

may be proved: If none of the witnesses

is living.., by two witnesses to the handwriting of one or both
of the subscribing witnesses thereto, or of the testator ...

If it be

shown under oath to the satisfaction of the court that, diligent
search having been made, only one witness can be found who can
make the required proof, then by the sworn testimony ...
one ... to such signatures or handwriting.

of such

It was early determined that the testimony of the subscribing witnesses is the primary or best evidence. As a result, if one of the subscribing witnesses cannot, or will not testify as to all the facts necessary
to show that the will was executed with the required formalities, there
can be no resort to secondary evidence until all of the remaining subscribing witnesses have been produced-or their unavailability explained.8 6
Except where the will is self proving, the failure to call subscribing
witnesses raises a presumption that the will was not signed by such
87
witnesses in the testator's presence.
L.

Undue Influence

Although clearly and perpetually the burden of proof is the contestant's, "undue influence" closely parallels testamentary capacity, unsound mind, and insane delusions, because it involves the "freedom of
the mind" and "free agency" of the testator.
A will may be avoided on the ground that the testator did not have
testamentary capacity to execute it; or that undue influence was exerted on the testator to the extent that such will results from such influence. However, the two terms are separate and distinct, and if ei88
ther is established the will is void.
A jury finding that the testatrix was lacking in mental or testamentary capacity would have precluded the existence of undue influence.8 9
The contestant, either by direct proof or circumstantial evidence,
must build his case upon the testator's age, relationship of the parties,
disposition, affection, physical and mental condition of the testator,
the ease with which he could be controlled by those in whom he had
86 Elnell v. Universalist, 76 Tex. 514, 13 S.W. 552 (1890).
87Jones v. Steinle, 15 S.W.2d 164 (rex. Civ. App.-Austin 1929, writ ref'd).
88 Michalak v. Dzierzanowski, 270 S.W.2d 276 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1954, no writ).
89 In re Estate of Olsson, 344 S.W.2d 171 (rex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1961, writ ref'd
n.r.e.).
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confidence, his desire for peace and quiet,9 0 the conduct of the alleged
wrong-doer, and all pertinent proof bringing about the "abortive" results. 9x

From the host of reported cases, it may be concluded that to be
classed as "undue influence," such influence must place the testator in
the attitude of saying: (1) It is not my will, but I must do it; (2) I
must act under such coercion, compulsion or constraint, that my own
92
free will is destroyed.
93
Undue influence may be established by circumstantial evidence,
but every case must be decided by its own peculiar facts.
Undue influence as an invalidating fact consists of two elements:
first, the external, the words or acts of third persons which bring the
pressure to bear; second, the internal, the collapse of the testator's own
9
will, produced by such external conduct.

4

(It is held that declarations

of the testator, of whatever type, are no evidence of the former but
only of the latter elements.) 95
The test of undue influence is whether such control was exercised
over the mind of the testator as to overcome his free agency and free
will and to substitute the will of another so as to cause the testator to
96
do what he would not otherwise have done but for such control.
Where witnesses are available, proof of planning and preparation of
the will is the heart of an undue influence case, and the burden is on
the one who attacks an instrument on the ground of undue influence
97
to both allege and prove that it was the product of such influence.
Undue influence cannot be presumed or inferred from opportunity
in relation to
or interest, but must be proved to have been exercised
98
the will itself, and not merely to other transactions.
The following jury submission, to which no objection was made by
either petitioners or respondents, is described by Associate Justice
99
Clyde Smith in his dissent (to other holdings) in Boyer v. Pool:
90Hart v. Hart, 110 S.W. 91 (Tex. Civ. App. 1908, no writ).
91 Gunlock v. Greenwade, 280 S.W.2d 610 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1955, writ ref'd
n.r.e.).
92 Pearce v. Cross, 414 S.W.2d 457 (Tex. Sup. 1967); In re Estate of Olsson, 344
S.W.2d 171 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1954, no writ); Abilene Christian College v. Landers,
371 S.W.2d 97 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1963, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
93 Long v. Long, 133 Tex. 96, 125 S.W.2d 1034 (1939).
94 Pearce v. Cross, 414 S.W.2d 457 (Tex. Sup. 1967).
95 MCCORMICK & RAY, TEXAS EVIDENCE, § 894 (2d ed. 1956).
90 Boyer v. Pool, 154 Tex. 586, 280 S.W.2d 564 (1955).

97 Curry v. Curry, 153 Tex. 421, 270 S.W.2d 208 (1954); Burns v. Brown, 248 S.W.2d
1019 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1952, writ ref'd); Besteiro v. Besteiro, 65 S.W.2d 759
(Tex. Comm'n App. 1933, judgment affirmed).
98 Pierson v. Pierson, 57 S.W.2d 633 (Tex. Civ. App.-Galveston 1933, writ ref'd).
99 154 Tex. 586, 280 S.W.2d 564 (1955).
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Undue influence is the exercise of sufficient control over the will
power and mind of the person, the validity of whose acts is
brought to question, to destroy his free agency and to constrain
him to do what he would not have done, if such control had not
been exercised; on the other hand, if a person of his own volition
and in the exercise of his own will and choice enters into a transaction, then he would not be laboring under undue influence.
This definition was followed by one special issue:
Do you find from a preponderance of the evidence in this case
that at the time of the making of the will in question herein on
March 5, 1949, the said Jasper Pool was induced to make said will
by the exercise of undue influence upon him by Mrs. Bertie
Boyer and Mrs. Bessie Blake, or either of them?
Answer: "He was induced" or "He was not induced."
Answer:
M.

Forgery

Because the authenticity of the actual signatures of the testator and
the attesting witnesses are so essential to a valid will, frequent claims
of forgery will be encountered in will contest cases.
Revised Civil Statute 2010, section 8, now Texas Rules of Civil
Procedure 93(h), requiring pleadings verified by affidavit has been
held' 01 not to apply to will contest cases because:
An application to probate a will is not in any proper sense a
pleading founded in whole or in part upon the instrument in
writing. The proceeding is one in rem, the very purpose of which
is to establish the validity, and the execution under the essential
formalities of law of the instrument as the last will and testament
of the testator .

.

. a will is not a written instrument capable of

being adduced in evidence in support of any pleading of recovery
or defense until it has been admitted to probate.
It is manifest, therefore, that this article has no bearing upon a
proceeding brought to probate a will, the execution of which under requisite legal formalities is the only matter for adjudication,
the burden of establishing all essential elements of which is imposed upon the proponent.
A single paragraph pleading by the contestant might simply allege:
The instrument was not in fact the last will and testament of the
deceased, was not written by him, or at his insistence, or request,
was not signed by him, was not executed by him with the formalities required by law to make it a valid will, and was a forgery.
100 Hogan v. Stoepler, 82 S.W.2d 1000 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1935, no writ).
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Handwriting standards of the decedent,' 0 ' comparison of handwriting, 0 2 opinions of experts, chemical, microscopic, photographic, scientific and assorted demonstrations, add color and persuasion in the trial
before the jury.
The following submission may be used:
Do you find from a preponderance of the evidence that the pur, deceased, on the instruported signature of
, in evidence before you
ment bearing date of
and offered for probate, is the genuine signature of
deceased?
Answer "Yes" or "No."
Answer:
Revocation
The Texas Probate Code, 0 3 among other requirements, places the
burden upon the proponent of a will to prove to the satisfaction of the
court that the will was not revoked by the testator.10 4 This statutory
requirement must be proved whether or not there is a contest and
whether or not the pleadings raise the issue.' 0 5

N.

The burden of establishing that a will has not been revoked is
placed by this statute on the proponent of the will sought to be
probated.
The rule is that where testator's will produced in court comes
from the custody of those to whom it has been delivered by the
testator, or is found among testator's papers in a place where he
usually keeps his valuable papers, and there is no suspicion cast
upon the genuineness of the will, there exists a presumption that
the will has not been revoked. Under such circumstances, a proponent has satisfied the statutory requirement to prove no revocation.
The methods of revoking a will are as definitely prescribed in the
Statute as the modes of making it, and no essential part of the one can
be dispensed with any more than the other. 06
No will in writing, and no clause thereof or devise therein, shall be
revoked, except by subsequent will, codicil, declaration in writing ex101 Nass v. Nass, 149 Tex. 41, 228 S.W.2d 130 (1950).
102 TEx. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 3737b (1957).

103 TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 88(b)(3) (1956).
104Turner v. Turner, 384 S.W.2d 195 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1964, no writ).
105 Ashley v. Usher, 384 S.W.2d 696 (Tex. Sup. 1964); Usher v. Gwynn, 375 S.W.2d
564 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1964, see Ashley v. Usher, supra).
106 Covington v. McDonald, 307 S.V.2d 335 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana 1957, no
writ); Pullen v. Russ, 209 S.W.2d 630 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1948, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
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ecuted with like formalities, or by the testator destroying or cancelling
the same; or causing it to be done in his presence. An obliteration of
10 7
any portion of the written instrument is ineffective.
Since the only proof that can possibly be offered to prove that the
will has not been revoked is negative proof, evidence from a witness
that he had no knowledge of a revocation of the will, as a matter of
law, is prima facie proof that the will had not been revoked. 10 8
Hence, this can most often be proved by asking an attesting witness:
"To your knowledge did (testator) ever revoke this will?"109
In the event the evidence of contestant is sufficient to overcome the
presumption of continuity and to thereby cast upon proponent the
burden of going forward with proof to establish the non-revocation of
the tendered will, the court should then submit to the jury an issue or
issues as to whether the proffered will has been revoked, properly placing the burden of proof upon proponent. 110
The issue of revocation has been submitted to the jury in this
form:''
Do you find from a preponderance of the evidence that Exhibit
P-1 (the instrument offered for probate) had not been revoked by
Howard S. Cunningham at the time of his death?
Answer "Yes" or "No."
Answer:
0.

Permissive Instructions

In addition to the usual instructions required in submitting a case
to the jury on Special Issues, will contest cases may require specialtreatment, depending upon the facts developed.
The following instructions illustrate the character of such treatment
and have been held proper under the facts then before the trial judge:
(Texas Revised Civil Statutes Ann., Article 3716-Dead Man's Stat112
ute.) Pursuant to Rule 182, the following charge was given:
You are instructed as a part of the law applicable to this case that
Mozelle Dyer Guinn as the surviving wife of William A. Guinn,
deceased, is not permitted by law to give evidence relating to any
107 Pullen v. Russ, 209 S.W.2d 630 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1948, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
108 Wilson v. Paulus, 15 S.W.2d 571 (Tex. Comm'n App. 1929, holding approved).
109 Stewart v. Long, 394 S.W.2d 25 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1965, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
110 Usher v. Gwynn, 375 S.W.2d 564 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1964) aff'd Ashley v.
Usher, 384 S.W.2d 696 (Tex. Sup. 1964).
1l Ashley v. Usher, 384 S.W.2d 696 (Tex. Sup. 1964).
112 Agricultural and Mechanical College v. Guinn, 326 S.W.2d 609 (Tex. Civ. App.Austin 1959, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
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transaction or conversation with or statement by the said William
A. Guinn, unless called to testify by A. &cM. College or Texas
Technological College.
(Undue Influence): In a case where contestants were relying upon
undue influence, the following instruction was given to the jury:" 3
You are further advised that not every influence exerted by one
person upon the mind of another, may be classed as undue influence. Persuasion, entreaty, importunity, argument, intercession
and solicitation, are permissible and do not constitute undue influence unless they subverted and overthrew the will and caused
the doing of something that the person subjected thereto did not
desire to do.
The Supreme Court has condemned the following instruction often
4
sought by the proponent:"
Every person who has attained the age of nineteen years, or who
is or has been lawfully married, being of testamentary capacity,
shall have the right and power to make his last will and testament
under the rules and limitations prescribed by law.
Associate Justice Walker writing for the Court said:
This instruction had no place in the charge. The information it
contained did not assist the jurors in passing on the issue submitted to them, and it served merely to confirm what they probably already knew about the legal effect of their answer.
P. Judgment in the District Court
Judgment on appeal or certiorari from any county court sitting in
probate shall be certified to such county court for observance. 115
When the suit in District Court is to set aside the probate of a will
already admitted to probate, and the proponent of the will prevails,
judgment that contestant take nothing should be entered. 16
Q.

Compromise and Settlement

As in other civil suits in the District Court, the devisees and heirs of
the deceased have a right to compromise their differences and to partition the property among themselves by mutual consent, subject to the
rights of creditors, and thus dispense with the necessity of probating
the will.

17

113 Taylor v. Taylor, 272 S.W.2d 636 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1954, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
114 Lindley v. Lindley, 384 S.W.2d 676 (Tex. Sup. 1964).
115 TEx. R. Civ. P. 331.
116 Lee v. Lee, 424 S.W.2d 609 (Tex. Sup. 1968).
117 Robbins v. Simmons' Estate, 252 S.W.2d 970 (Tex. Civ. App.-Galveston 1952,
writ ref'd n.r.e.); Wade v. Wade, 140 Tex. 339, 167 S.W.2d 1008 (1943).
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The law favors the settlement in good faith of will contests by a socalled "family settlement."" 8
Termination of family controversies by compromise and settlement,
and the avoiding of, or forbearance from, contesting the will, furnishes
a sufficient consideration to support an agreement entered into for that
purpose, except as to a party thereto who is not a person in interest. 119
CONCLUSION

Within the foregoing paragraphs we have touched very briefly on
aspects of the will contest case. There are other areas which have been
excluded because of space limitations.
The successful proponent must continuously keep before the jury
the fact that it is their function to pass upon the conditions existing at
the time of the execution of the will. The jurors' personal feelings or
concepts of what might have been done do not reflect the problem in
controversy.
The successful contestant must convince the jury that the depriving
of his clients of their fair share in the estate must have resulted from
the lack of testamentary capacity of the deceased, undue influence, or
other defects in the execution of the purported will. Only the application of Texas law upon the scales of the wide experience and wise understanding of the jurors, can correct such fraud, prevent discrimination, and avoid a grave miscarriage of justice.
But-after the clamor of the trial has subsided, and the parties depart-Justice Norvell's quotation from an earlier case 120 stands as a
tribute to the properly prepared and executed will.
The power of disposing of property is an inestimable privilege of
the old. It frequently commands attention and respect when other
motives have ceased to influence. How often, without it, would
the hoary head be neglected, deserted and despised. It is indeed a
sad commentary upon humanity that when filial love has failed,
and gratitude and devotion have passed away, the fear and awe
inspired by the power of testamentary disposition of property becomes the "shadow of a rock in a weary land," and will insure the
greatest respect and most devoted attention. Except in extreme
cases of imbecility, the aged and decrepit should not be 12
deprived
of this last defense against ingratitude and base neglect. '
118 Stringfellow v. Early, 40 S.W. 871 (Case 2) (Tex. Civ. App.-1897, no writ).
119 Kellner v. Blaschke, 334 S.W.2d 315 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1960, writ ref'd
n.r.e.).
120 Salinas v. Garcia, 135 S.W. 588 (Tex. Civ. App.-1911, writ ref'd); Sloan v. Maxwell,
3 N.J. Eq. 563 (1831).
121 Garcia v. Galindo, 199 S.W.2d 488 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1946, rev. other
grounds 199 S.W.2d 488).
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